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This paper argues that ethical views that place primary importance 
on the reduction of extreme suffering imply that, at least in theory, 
it can be better to allow enhanced non-human animals to come into 
existence rather than unenhanced non-human animals. Furthermore, 
they imply that it would be even better if no non-human animals 
came into existence at all. However, it is unclear, from the perspective 
of these ethical views, whether enhancement or reduction of future 
populations is the more effective strategy in practice, and whether 
it might even be better to instead pursue a seemingly more robust 
and less controversial third option of promoting greater concern for 
the suffering of non-human animals in the first place. In this paper, 
I seek to explore the different options from a practical perspective.
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In this paper I wish to examine what ethical views that place 
primary importance on the reduction of extreme suffering im-
ply for the moral status of animal enhancement. In particular, 
I will argue that, according to such views, it can be better to 
allow certain enhanced non-human animals to come into exis-
tence rather than unenhanced non-human animals, yet the best 
would be if no non-human animals came into existence at all. 
I then proceed to discuss the implications of this conclusion 
for practical efforts to reduce extreme suffering for non-human 
animals.
Preliminaries
I would like to first clarify the scope and terminology of 
my argument. First of all, the argument I am making here per-
tains only to non-human animals. This is not to say that the 
argument cannot be made with respect to humans as well, but 
merely that this is not my concern in this essay. One reason for 
this is that non-human animals generally possess a very limited 
degree of moral agency. To a first approximation, most humans 
can be considered moral agents, whereas non-human animals 
cannot, at least not nearly to the same extent. And such moral 
agency does complicate discussions about the potential effects 
of enhancement and their ethical status, complications that can 
be ignored if we restrict our argument to non-human animals 
only. Note that I am not claiming that moral agents should 
be granted greater moral consideration than non-agents. The 
complications I seek to avoid by excluding moral agents mostly 
have to do with the ability that such agents have to help others.
Second, I should like to clarify what I mean by “ethical 
views that place primary importance on the reduction of ex-
treme suffering”. By this I mean all ethical views according 
to which an action’s propensity to reduce extreme suffering 
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is the most important, yet not necessarily the only, criterion 
by which we evaluate its value and ethical status. This evalua-
tive criterion comprises a consequentialist element of a moral 
theory. If this element stands alone, i.e. if an action’s propensity 
to reduce extreme suffering is the only criterion by which we 
evaluate its value and normativity, one gets a particular kind of 
pure negative utilitarian view. Yet one can also include it as an 
element in a larger set of values. The crucial point, however, 
is that the ethical views whose implications I seek to examine 
here are those according to which this element is granted an 
overriding status. That is, views according to which the reduc-
tion of extreme suffering has overriding value, whether we also 
consider other things valuable or not (I shall abbreviate this 
class of ethical views by VPES, standing for “Values that grant 
Primacy to the reduction of Extreme Suffering”). For example, 
one can combine an overriding concern for the reduction of 
extreme suffering with consequentialist views according to 
which knowledge and happiness are also valuable. According 
to such a pluralist view, an outcome with more knowledge and 
more happiness would, other things being equal, be better than 
an outcome with less of these. Yet outcomes with more extreme 
suffering would always be worse than those with less, even if 
the outcomes with less suffering contain more knowledge or 
happiness. It is in this sense that the reduction of extreme suf-
fering is granted an overriding status by VPES.
I shall not provide an elaborate defense of this view of the 
moral status of extreme suffering here (for that, I recommend 
consulting the sources cited below). A brief motivating thought 
experiment in its favor is to imagine two different planets, one 
of which can contain all the good things we can possibly imag-
ine, while the other can contain only beings who experience 
extreme suffering, e.g., beings who experience being eaten or 
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skinned alive. The question, then, is whether we believe that 
adding good things, including happy lives, to the first planet 
can justify adding more extreme suffering to the other planet. 
VPES can be justified with reference to the intuition that no 
amount of good things added to the good planet can justify add-
ing more extreme suffering to the bad one. Or, phrased more 
generally, that no amount of good things added to the world 
can justify adding more extreme suffering to it. This intuition 
can in turn be justified with reference to other intuitions about 
the moral importance of reducing extreme suffering versus 
promoting good things, such as happiness. For example, some 
(Popper 1945, chap. 9, note 2), have argued that there is a moral 
urgency – “a direct moral appeal for help” – in reducing suf-
fering while there is no similar urgency or moral importance in 
increasing the happiness of the already happy. And even if one 
thinks other things do carry some moral urgency, such as in-
creasing happiness and increasing knowledge, it seems plausi-
ble that this urgency is not comparable to the moral urgency of 
reducing extreme suffering. Karl Popper argued for this exact 
claim with respect to happiness: “ . . . the promotion of happi-
ness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help 
to those who suffer . . . ” (Popper 1945, chap. 5, note 6). As for 
the idea that happy experiences or other good things can com-
pensate for extreme suffering, one can question in what sense 
this could be the case. For example, some people claim to have 
experienced suffering so extreme that, according to them, no 
amount of good things could ever compensate for it (Vinding 
2018a, chap. 7), which raises serious questions of how, and by 
whose standards, positive experiences or other positive goods 
are supposed to be able to compensate for these negative states. 
This is not obvious. Indeed, it is a widely held intuition that the 
most extreme states of suffering cannot be counterbalanced by 
positive experiences (Gloor & Mannino 2016, section II).
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A fuller defense of the view that reducing extreme suffering 
has moral primacy can be found in (Vinding 2018a, chap. 6-7); 
(Vinding 2019, part I); (Leighton 2011, chap. 9); and (Gloor & 
Mannino 2016). It is worth noting that this view bears simi-
larity to ethical views found within the tradition of Buddhism 
(Goodman 2009, 101), as well as to the view defended in Jamie 
Mayerfeld’s Suffering and Moral Responsibility (Mayerfeld 
1999, chap. 4-6). Indeed, a foremost moral priority to extreme 
suffering can be grounded in many different premises, such as 
by appeal to a prioritarian position or to the intrinsic badness of 
extreme suffering itself, and these premises may be combined 
or stand alone (Vinding, 2019, part I; Mayerfeld 1999, pp. 149-
152). Furthermore, to underscore the relevance of examining 
the implications of VPES, it is worth noting that a recent sur-
vey in which 14,866 people were asked what goals they thought 
should be strived for by a future civilization, the goal that was 
favored more than any other, i.e. by a significant plurality, was 
minimizing suffering (Future of Life Institute 2017).
Third, I should also clarify that my argument is restricted 
to only concern beings who have not yet been brought into 
existence. There are three reasons why I have chosen this re-
striction: (1) because it allows us to steer clear of many com-
plications that arise concerning the ethics of altering or kill-
ing existing beings versus altering or preventing the existence 
of future (merely) potential beings; (2) because future beings 
who have not yet been born likely comprise the vast majority 
of the beings we are able to impact with our actions (Beck-
stead 2013); and (3) because, even if we disregard the previ-
ous reason, our discussion concerning enhancement pertains 
primarily to future beings, since the extent to which we can 
change populations of currently living non-human animals, 
via enhancement or otherwise, is likely limited compared to 
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how much we will be able to change them in the future, when 
humanity will presumably be significantly wealthier and more 
technologically capable.
Lastly, I should clarify what I mean by “enhanced non-hu-
man animals” in this paper. By this I simply mean non-human 
animals who have been altered by humans (e.g., via gene ed-
iting or selective breeding) primarily for the purpose of ben-
efiting these beings themselves (and hence enhancement, as I 
use the term, also encapsulates what is usually referred to as 
disenhancement, such as the reduction or removal of the abil-
ity to experience suffering). This definition excludes beings 
who have been altered purely for human benefit. It does not, 
however, exclude beings who do not in fact gain a net benefit, 
or who are even harmed, by the attempt to benefit them. In 
other words, the loaded term “enhanced non-human animals” 
neglects an important possibility which should not be over-
looked, namely that human alterations of non-human animals, 
even when they are well-intentioned, can go wrong.
An Enhanced Population Can Be Better; No 
Population is Best
There are two claims I wish to argue for here. The first is 
that, according to VPES, it can be better, at least in theory, 
to allow enhanced non-human animals to come into existence 
rather than unenhanced non-human animals. To realize this, 
we can imagine a scenario where a fixed number of non-hu-
man animals will come into existence in the future (on all of 
Earth, say). Provided that we can successfully alter this future 
population in such a way that it will contain less extreme suf-
fering than it otherwise would—for example, by significantly 
down-regulating the pain-sensitivity of all individuals in the 
population (Pearce 2015, 157; Pearce 2016)—then such an al-
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teration would, other things being equal, be normative accord-
ing to VPES. Whether such enhancements are indeed feasible 
for humanity to realize for a large population of non-human 
individuals in practice, both technologically and sociologically, 
is another issue, one we shall return to below.
The second claim I wish to establish here is that, even in 
the best case, an enhanced future population of non-human 
animals would still, according VPES, be strictly worse than 
no population of non-human animals at all, other things being 
equal. That is, between an idealized replacement option where 
unenhanced non-human animals are replaced, within one gen-
eration, by enhanced non-human animals, and a cessation op-
tion where no new beings are brought into existence, the latter 
is strictly better according to VPES.
This holds true since a population of zero non-human ani-
mals entails no extreme suffering, or indeed any suffering at 
all, for such beings, whereas this would not be true, even in the 
best possible case, of a future enhanced population. For even if 
it is possible to eventually get to a point where we have altered 
non-human animals so much that they can no longer experi-
ence extreme suffering, it is clearly not possible to get to that 
point in a single generation. For example, in any population 
of considerable size, accidents that cause severe bodily harm 
are bound to happen (e.g., severe burns or crushing of a body 
part), and it is not plausible that extreme suffering could be 
made impossible in the face of such accidents in just a single 
generation. Beyond that, there is also the problem of predation 
(McMahan 2016) and the extreme suffering it entails, which 
would also be impossible to phase out in just a single genera-
tion, or even a few.
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Furthermore, even if we were to reach a stage where we 
have altered non-human animals so much that we are reason-
ably confident that they cannot experience extreme suffering, 
there would still be a risk that they in fact can and will, a risk 
which, even if quite small, would be much smaller still if there 
were no non-human animals at all. Indeed, this risk seems 
bound to remain significant, since non-human animals, unlike 
humans, cannot communicate their subjective states as well 
and in as much detail as humans can, both in terms of how they 
are feeling, and what the source of a given feeling seems to be. 
It seems doubtful, for example, that we would be able to assert 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a group of small fish is unable 
to experience extreme suffering merely by observing their be-
havior and knowing their full genetic profile. Thus, even in the 
best possible case where we have gathered as much information 
as we can, it seems that there would still be considerable un-
certainty about the experiential states of enhanced non-human 
animals, and hence considerable risk of the realization of states 
of extreme suffering in these beings. (There would arguably be 
significantly less uncertainty in the case of humans, and this 
difference between human and non-human beings constitutes 
a reason, though by no means a decisive one, to favor a popula-
tion of enhanced humans rather than of enhanced non-humans 
from the perspective of VPES; another such reason is the fact 
that non-human individuals and their suffering are generally 
granted far less moral concern by humanity than are human 
individuals, implying that non-humans face a greater risk of 
being harmed by humans). This risk should be minimized ac-
cording to VPES, which is another reason why, even in the best 
case, and even disregarding the point made above concerning 
the impossibility of abolishing extreme suffering via enhance-
ment in a few generations, a zero population would still, other 
things being equal, be strictly better than a population of en-
Magnus Vinding
208
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
hanced non-human animals according to VPES. (It is worth 
noting that views other than VPES can favor a similar con-
clusion; for instance, (Ng 1995) and (Horta 2015) argue that 
suffering and disvalue prevail in the lives of most non-human 
animals, which, if true, would imply that a zero population 
would be better than the current one according to many dif-
ferent value systems, while (Vinding 2016) argues that merely 
applying a non-speciesist position on procreative ethics implies 
that it would be better if the vast majority of non-human ani-
mals were never born.)
In sum, a future population of enhanced non-human ani-
mals would, even in the best case, entail significant amounts, 
as well as risks, of extreme suffering, which, other things be-
ing equal, renders such a population worse than no population 
according to VPES. And since this conclusion also applies to 
any given sub-population within a larger population, it follows 
that a smaller population, of both enhanced and unenhanced 
non-human animals, is, other things being equal, better than a 
larger one.
Practical Implications: Two Controversial 
Options
These conclusions are all rather theoretical, however, as they 
do not factor in any considerations about the practical feasibil-
ity of these two options of (1) enhancing future populations 
of non-human animals and (2) reducing or phasing them out 
altogether. For even if one accepts the evaluative conclusion we 
have drawn above at the theoretical level, one may still main-
tain that the best thing we can do to reduce extreme suffering, 
in practice, is to focus on enhancement rather than on phasing 
out or reducing populations of non-human animals.
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This view is held by negative utilitarian David Pearce, who 
focuses primarily on the enhancement of future populations 
of non-human animals so as to gradually reduce, and eventu-
ally abolish, their suffering throughout the living world (Pearce 
2007; 2015; 2016). He considers this the most promising and 
feasible way to reduce the suffering, including extreme suffer-
ing in particular, of non-human animals, all things considered. 
This is in part because he considers the option of enhancement, 
particularly via so-called CRISPR-based gene drives, a unique-
ly cheap way to reduce the suffering of non-human animals 
(Pearce 2016), but also in large part because he believes most 
people are more receptive to the idea of enhancing non-human 
animals than they are to the idea of phasing them out or signifi-
cantly reducing their numbers (personal communication).
In contrast, Brian Tomasik, another negative utilitarian who 
has also written extensively about how to best reduce the suf-
fering of non-human animals, believes the most promising 
approach to focus on is instead to reduce populations of non-
human animals (Tomasik 2015c, 144; 2016a; 2016b). In par-
ticular, Tomasik views the reduction of natural habitats as a 
promising way to achieve such population reductions, which 
he considers more realistic than Pearce’s strategy of encour-
aging humanity to altruistically pursue enhancements of non-
human animals that have no benefit for humanity itself (To-
masik 2016a, 2016b). Indeed, Tomasik notes that he believes, 
with “99+% probability”, that widespread altruistic efforts of 
the sort Pearce proposes to help wild animals will never come 
to fruition (Tomasik 2016b).
In the context of this paper, it is worth examining these re-
spective proposals made by Pearce and Tomasik, including the 
reasoning behind them, in depth. For they are, to my knowl-
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edge, the only concrete intervention proposals that have been 
defended with respect to the particular goal of minimizing the 
extreme suffering of future non-human animals. The underly-
ing question here—which practical actions can be expected to 
best reduce extreme suffering?—is, it should be noted, an em-
pirical question, one that depends on various factors which can 
be broken down and examined individually.
For one, there is the question of receptivity. Which idea 
would people be most willing to accept? As noted above, 
Pearce’s position is in part animated by the belief that people 
will generally be more open to the idea of enhancement than 
they are to pure population reduction. Tomasik’s position, on 
the other hand, rests more on the belief that most people would 
be too selfish and anthropocentric to support such altruistic ef-
forts. And there are indeed reasons to be skeptical of the idea 
that enhancement would be more welcome than reductions of 
future populations. One such reason is that enhancement efforts 
of this kind seem bound to entail a significant amount of ex-
perimentation on non-human animals, which may be opposed 
by many. For although some studies indicate that a majority of 
people support such experimentation “so long as it is for [hu-
man] medical research purposes and there is no alternative” 
(Clemence & Leaman 2016, 4; Souza et al. 2017, 112), it should 
be noted that (1) the opposition against such experimentation 
is still significant, and (2) it is unclear whether there would be 
similar support for experimentation aimed toward reducing the 
suffering of non-human animals.
Beyond that, there is the fact many people still reject geneti-
cally modified (GMO) foods, despite many scientific studies 
concluding that they are as safe to consume as non-GMO foods 
(National Academies of Sciences 2016), which also constitutes 
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at least a weak reason to expect resistance to the idea of modi-
fying non-human animals for their own sake. As for whether 
many people will ever be willing to benefit non-human indi-
viduals in the first place, there arguably is some evidence that 
people are in fact already supportive, at least in a generic sense. 
For example, a 1999 poll conducted in the United States found 
that 76 percent of people agreed that a “[non-human] animal’s 
right to live free of suffering is just as important as a [human] 
person’s right to live free of suffering” (Appleby 2008, 249).
Tomasik’s proposal, however, is in large part animated by 
the view that efforts to reduce or enhance future populations of 
non-human animals for altruistic reasons is unrealistic. There-
fore, rather than trying to appeal to human altruism, Tomasik’s 
view is that the best thing to do is to push for interventions that 
reduce non-human populations, and that humans already want 
anyway for self-interested reasons, such as replacing grass 
lawns by gravel lawns or solar panels (Tomasik 2015a). As To-
masik writes:
Reducing wild-animal populations can be done by 
working with the grain of human selfishness rather 
than against it. For this reason, reducing populations 
seems plausibly more impactful as a way to prevent 
animal suffering in the short run than developing ex-
pensive, high-tech solutions that won’t arrive for many 
years and that humans have no selfish reason to deploy 
(Tomasik, 2016c).
Yet elsewhere, Tomasik argues that it nonetheless could 
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It would be a shame if people rested all their hopes 
on gene drives and didn’t pursue other approaches 
to help wild animals in the short run. But exploring 
gene drives as one “high-risk stock” within a diversi-
fied portfolio of compassionate-biology research topics 
seems reasonable (Tomasik 2016b).
Thus, it need not be either-or, as one can clearly support ef-
forts to both reduce and enhance future populations of non-
human animals simultaneously, which Pearce does too, as he 
advocates for cross-species fertility regulation to prevent non-
human animal populations from increasing (Pearce 2016). And 
so rather than being a matter of the one approach versus the 
other, the question is arguably just what level and form the em-
phasis on these two respective strategies should ideally take—
a question that in turn depends on some of the open questions 
that have been raised above, namely: how receptive will hu-
manity be to these respective ideas? And how altruistic can we 
expect humans to be toward non-human animals in the future? 
These are empirical questions that can, and probably should 
(from the perspective of VPES), be examined closer.
These questions about human attitudes are not the only rel-
evant questions, however. Another important question is how 
technologically and economically feasible these proposed 
solutions are. Covering land with gravel or solar panels, for 
instance, is expensive, and covering all of Earth in this way 
will not be technologically nor economically feasible for the 
foreseeable future, if indeed ever. And the point Pearce would 
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Back-of-an-envelope calculation suggests the financial 
cost of a happy non-human biosphere [by means of en-
hancement, e.g., via CRISPR gene drives] would cur-
rently be several hundred million dollars – plus annual 
maintenance costs of perhaps several million dollars 
per year (Pearce 2016).
In other words: all sentient beings on Earth could, accord-
ing to Pearce, have their suffering alleviated and eventually 
abolished relatively cheaply. This is a staggering and highly 
disputable claim, of course. Yet it does nonetheless seem plau-
sible that this enhancement solution could potentially, provided 
that it is indeed technically feasible, be much cheaper than the 
strategy of covering land, at least for very large areas of land. 
And if Pearce is right about the technological feasibility and 
low price of such an endeavor, this also has implications for 
the level of altruism required to make such a project happen. It 
could turn out to be very little.
Whether Pearce’s estimates of both the technological and 
economic feasibility of such an effort of global enhancement 
of non-human animals are realistic is yet another empirical 
question that can be examined further. And along with the em-
pirical questions listed above concerning human attitudes, this 
question is critical to explore in order to settle which of the two 
options discussed here – basically, enhancement via technol-
ogy versus population reduction by means of habitat reduction 
– is best to spend one’s marginal resources on in order to re-
duce extreme suffering.
A Third Option?
Might there, however, be a third option that is even better 
than the two options examined above? At a first glance, if one 
Magnus Vinding
214
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
only looks at the level of direct interventions, there do indeed 
seem to be only two main options for reducing the suffering of 
future non-human animals – namely, to either reduce or change 
their populations significantly. Yet this does not imply that a di-
rect focus on either of these two options is optimal in practice, 
when we factor in more indirect actions we can take.
At the level of advocacy, there seems to be a real risk that 
advocating for enhancement and/or reduction of future popu-
lations of non-human animals could backfire and end up be-
ing counterproductive due to the controversial nature of these 
proposals. Indeed, it seems likely that many people who would 
otherwise support the underlying value that animates these 
proposals—i.e. the reduction of extreme suffering experienced 
by non-human animals—will nonetheless reject these contro-
versial proposals for intervention, a rejection that seems even 
more likely if this underlying value has not been explained and 
argued for carefully in the first place.
This, then, tentatively suggests another approach to priori-
tize: to promote concern for the suffering, especially the ex-
treme suffering, experienced by non-human animals, and to 
argue for the moral primacy of its reduction. Beyond the fact 
that people will likely be more receptive to such a message, a 
lack of concern for non-human suffering may also constitute 
the main bottleneck with respect to the realization of concrete 
interventions that prevent extreme suffering, such as those dis-
cussed above. Pearce, for instance, seems to view humanity’s 
level of concern for the suffering of non-human animals, not 
technological or economic limitations, as the main bottleneck 
by far that prevents the realization of the enhancement scenario 
he argues for (Pearce 2007; 2016). Tomasik, too, seems to view 
such a focus on values as being uniquely promising, among 
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other reasons because: (1) it is more robust in the face of new 
information—promoting a set of values seems more likely to 
be positive for the realization of these values than promoting 
particular interventions that may turn out to be negative in light 
of new information; (2) one can build a movement around these 
values, which both seems more feasible than does building a 
movement centered around, say, habitat reduction, as well as 
more likely to be positive and flexible with respect to optimiz-
ing that set of values than a more specific focus on a particular 
intervention (e.g., one can thereby get more people to join the 
endeavor of figuring out which concrete interventions best help 
alleviate the suffering of non-human animals, and how to best 
reduce extreme suffering in general); and finally, (3) a focus 
on promoting VPES seems less replaceable than most other ef-
forts one could pursue to reduce extreme suffering:
Most object-level projects that one might undertake are 
already being done by lots of people with various ideo-
logical positions. In contrast, there are very few people 
promoting suffering-focused ethical viewpoints. So 
efforts to promote suffering-focused ethics may have 
more counterfactual impact than promoting a more 
mainstream cause that’s less specific to your values 
(Tomasik 2015b).
And one may argue that habitat reduction, although it is all 
but never considered an altruistic cause, indeed is an endeavor 
that is carried out by many more people than is advocacy for 
the moral significance of the extreme suffering of non-human 
animals, and hence that one may expect, by the argument in 
Tomasik’s quote above, that using one’s marginal resources to 
promote habitat reduction would be less effective than the pro-
motion of concern for such suffering. Also because, even if 
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one believes that the best one can do, in terms of direct inter-
ventions, is to push for slightly more habitat reduction on the 
margin, it could be that focusing primarily on the promotion of 
concern for the suffering of non-human animals is the best way 
to gain support for such efforts in the first place.
The fact that it is such a clear point of agreement that the 
promotion of concern for the extreme suffering of non-human 
animals is beneficial with respect to VPES, and that it indeed 
may be what best addresses the most crucial bottleneck with 
respect to the alleviation of such extreme suffering, also com-
prises a reason to focus one’s practical efforts most strongly on 
the promotion of such concern. In contrast, the utility of any 
given direct intervention (e.g. habitat reduction or enhance-
ment via genetic engineering) is much less agreed upon, and 
also in part for that reason more controversial, which consti-
tutes a reason to be more careful and hesitant about focusing 
mostly on such interventions (both due to considerations con-
cerning cooperation between disagreeing agents, as well as 
considerations about epistemic humility in light of empirical 
disagreements, in this case about what best reduces extreme 
suffering in practice).
It should be noted in this context, however, that, from the per-
spective of VPES, it is not enough to merely promote increased 
moral consideration for non-human animals per se, since such 
increased consideration for these individuals, if not coupled 
with a strong concern for their suffering, may in fact lead to an 
increase rather than a reduction of suffering for these individu-
als. This is because other value systems may favor increasing 
the numbers of those beings who fall within the notional circle 
of moral consideration, even if such an increase happens at the 
cost of an increase in extreme suffering. In this way, generic 
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moral circle expansion can actually end up being a very bad 
thing from the perspective of VPES, and hence should likely, 
from this perspective, be supplemented strongly by arguments 
for the moral primacy of reducing extreme suffering (Vinding 
2018a, chap. 9; Vinding 2018b; Tomasik 2015b).
Conversely, it is also true that merely promoting concern 
for extreme suffering is not sufficient either, as there is a risk 
that such increased concern will fail to pertain properly to the 
suffering of non-human animals, as opposed to relating al-
most purely to human suffering. Thus, from the perspective of 
VPES, both widening the moral circle and deepening concern 
for extreme suffering are necessary yet insufficient on their 
own (Vinding 2018a, chap. 9). How to best effect such changes 
in society in more concrete terms stands as an open question, 
yet producing and publicizing written pieces, lectures, and 
documentaries that argue for such a broader and deeper con-
cern for extreme suffering seem promising options.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that, even in the best case, a fu-
ture population of enhanced non-human animals would entail 
significant amounts, as well as risks, of extreme suffering. This 
renders such a population worse than no population according 
to VPES, and a smaller population better than a larger one, 
other things being equal.
These theoretical conclusions concerning the implications 
of VPES are important and worth being clear about, not least 
because they imply that it would be better, according to VPES, 
to avoid increasing future populations (for instance, by spread-
ing non-human animal life into space), even if we believed the 
risk that these populations will entail extreme suffering to be 
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very low. Nonetheless, these theoretical conclusions still do not 
clearly show which actions that are optimal to take in practice 
in order to best reduce the extreme suffering of future non-
human animals, which stands as an open empirical question. 
The utility of focusing on concrete interventions directed at en-
hancing and/or reducing future non-human animal populations 
is unclear and dependent on various factors, some of which can 
be investigated empirically, such as people’s attitudes toward 
such proposals, the level of altruism we can expect humans to 
exercise toward non-human animals, and the technological and 
economic feasibility of the concrete interventions in question. 
Such investigations may help inform which specific interven-
tions are most worth focusing on, if any.
Finally, I presented some reasons why the best way to reduce 
extreme suffering for future non-human animals, in practice, 
may be to focus mostly on the strategy of promoting concern 
for such suffering in the first place, such as by arguing that its 
reduction has moral primacy. This seems a more robust strategy 
that one can more easily build a movement around compared to 
if one were to focus more purely on direct and controversial in-
terventions, such as gene editing or habitat reduction. Beyond 
that, such increased concern may also be what best addresses 
the main bottleneck that prevents us from knowing and doing 
more at the level of direct interventions, and hence this indirect 
strategy could well be the best way to foster progress at this 
more direct level as well. In other words, rather than focusing 
mostly on enhancing or otherwise altering non-human animal 
populations, the best way to reduce the extreme suffering of 
non-human animals in the future may, at this point at least, be 
to focus most of our resources on enhancing humanity’s con-
cern for such suffering first and foremost, and to argue for the 
moral primacy of its reduction.
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